Richard M. Ebeling compiled and edited this anthology, first published in 1978 and issued by the Mises Institute with a 1996 copyright. It gathers four separate essays on boom and bust, by Gottfried Haberler in 1932, Ludwig von Mises in 1936, Murray N. Rothbard in 1969 and Friedrich A. Hayek in a 1970 lecture, framed by Roger W. Garrison's introduction and closing summary. Garrison writes that the theory has no single canonical version, and the book rewards a reader who compares its variations, disagreements included. Its question is how newly created credit can draw resources into commitments that later consumption will not support, and why explaining that initiating mismatch leaves open the depth of the contraction and the right response to it.
Mises starts from the loan market. Banks that extend credit beyond their own assets and the funds clients entrusted to them push the rate of interest below where it would have stood, and projects that looked unprofitable at the old rate begin. Credit creates no extra labor or materials, so those projects bid up wages and input prices while consumers, whose preferences never shifted toward waiting, keep spending on present goods. Garrison adds that stages far from consumption respond most to a rate change because discounting weighs their distant returns heavily. He separates aggregate overinvestment from malinvestment across stages and centers on malinvestment, so the better diagnostic asks where resources were committed and when their output arrives. Mises notes that banks raise nominal rates during the boom, yet the gross rate then includes compensation for rising prices and can stay too low, so the printed rate cannot by itself show whether the model applies.
Haberler and Hayek look beneath the price index. In Haberler's comparison, growing production would lower prices unless the circulating medium expands, and credit large enough to offset that decline is a relative inflation hidden by a stable wholesale index. He reads the production growth of 1924 through 1928 this way and judges it probable that this relative inflation brought about the trouble. Hayek follows new money from its point of entry. The first recipients, such as a government funding public works or borrowers buying investment goods, bid for particular goods and factors before other prices adjust, and later recipients spend it onward, so prices rise in succession. A steady average can therefore coexist with relative-price shifts that redirect production. That distinction gives a reader a question to put to any stable index today, and answering it requires current measurement that these period examples cannot supply.
Rothbard sets the burden a cycle theory has to carry. Since markets weed out poor forecasters and losses are usually scattered, he asks why many previously successful entrepreneurs suffer losses together and why producer goods industries swing harder than consumer goods industries. His proposed answer is a common signal: credit expansion misstates the saving available. In his model time preferences have not changed, so workers spending the new money received as wages restore their old consumption proportions. Wages and materials bid up in the capital goods industries then cost more than the misdirected projects can earn, and in Garrison's account overcommitted investors bidding for scarce resources turn the artificially low rate into a high real rate. Many enterprises launched on that signal stop appearing profitable, and some scale back while others close. Garrison also answers the objection that entrepreneurs can learn to anticipate policy: its effects on particular product and factor prices within a multistage capital structure are too complex to sort out and hedge fully.
The contributors divide over the downturn. Haberler separates the initial dislocation from a secondary wave of pessimism and credit deflation spread by bank failures, which can grow to overwhelming importance in no fixed proportion to the original error. He holds that this secondary deflation can and must be combated, while warning against recreating the distorted flow of spending that caused the trouble. Rothbard prescribes a stricter course: government ends inflation and cuts its budget while refusing bailouts, wage supports, props for producers' goods prices and reinflation. Garrison notes that under extreme assumptions about labor mobility capital could be restructured with no change in total employment, whereas actual labor markets turn misallocation into unemployment that falling incomes and spending can compound. Secondary here names a causal and temporal order and can carry the larger share of the damage, so a mechanism for the initiating mismatch cannot by itself account for the depth or duration of the 1930s.
Hayek's 1970 lecture turns to the political cost of stopping. Monetary restraint is technically within reach, but unexpected price increases support profits and jobs that lose the stimulus once the increases are expected. Hayek denies that starting inflation leads inevitably to hyperinflation; his conditional claim is that prolonging the surprise requires an ever-rising rate, while braking exposes work adapted to the old spending path. By his own admission, stop-go policy kept its effect longer than he expected, and he allows that forced saving can leave some lasting output. For postwar inflation in the advanced Western economies he blames union wage-setting combined with full-employment commitments, a 1970 diagnosis that needs fresh evidence before anyone applies it to later decades, and he declines to call gold the best conceivable arrangement or to restore it before wage determination is settled.
A reader comfortable with how prices and interest coordinate saving can use this book to compare a capital-based account of the cycle with the monetary and aggregate-demand accounts it disputes, and to ask what evidence would separate a boom's misdirected commitments from the contraction that follows. Expect a short theoretical anthology with simple diagrams in Garrison's summary. Its contributors argue for policies in the circumstances of their own decades, and applying any of them to a present economy would require modern causal evidence the book does not attempt. The Mises Institute publishes the official PDF of the 1996 edition for free download.