Yochai Benkler's 2006 Yale book argues that cheap networked computers let social sharing produce information beside markets and firms, and that law shapes its reach.
Information is nonrival and an input to new information. Charging for existing inputs raises later creators' costs, though first copies still consume resources. Benkler argues stronger patents or copyrights may leave those who both use and produce information worse off.
Small modules lower the minimum commitment, so a five-minute Slashdot moderation admits more people than an hours-long bug fix. Integration and quality review still cost effort. One textbook project needed coherence for state guidelines, so contributions were large and abstract; many initial volunteers left theirs unfinished. Free software combines hobbyists with programmers paid by firms such as IBM.
Cheaper tools widen the feasible set, yet his conclusion leaves the outcome to fights over physical, logical and content rules, judged by his liberal-egalitarian tests of autonomy and democratic discourse. The book suits readers weighing how commons, firms and markets reward and govern work, including costs a celebration of sharing can hide.